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NOTES 
Self-Incrimination: Privilege, Immunity, and Comment 
in Bar Disciplinary Proceedings 
The questions of the extent of an attorney's right to claim the 
privilege against self-incrimination during bar disciplinary proceed-
ings and of the consequences of the exercise of the privilege has 
created a sharp division of opinion.1 The privilege against self-
incrimination necessarily involves a conflict between the public's 
interest in disclosure and the individual's interest in privacy and 
nondisclosure.2 However, the conflict is exacerbated when the indi-
vidual claiming the privilege is entrusted with important public 
responsibilities. 
Attorney disciplinary proceedings, which are intended to main-
tain the high standards of the bar, are part of the over-all system of 
state regulation of the practice of law.3 The state courts have tradi-
tionally been held to have an implied or inherent power to discipline 
the attorneys who practice before them and who serve as officers of 
their courts.4 Although at one time state supreme courts handled 
I. Many commentators have been critical of the Supreme Court's extension in 
Spevack. v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967), of the privilege against self-incrimination to 
attorneys in disciplinary proceedings. See Cathey, The Fifth Amendment-Its Protec• 
tion of the Right to Become and Remain a Lawyer, 21 ARK. L. R.Ev. 361 (1967); Cole, 
Bar Discipline and Spevack v. Klein, 53 A.B.A.J. 819 (1967); Franck., The Myth of 
Spevack v. Klein, 54 A.B.A.J. 970 (1968); Underwood, Fifth Amendment and the 
Lawyer, 62 Nw. U. L. REv. 129 (1967), A constitutional amendment excepting lawyers 
in disciplinary proceedings from the protection of the fifth amendment has been 
proposed by Cole, supra, and Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case 
for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 671 (1968). Other writers have been more 
receptive to Spevack. See, e.g., Niles & Kaye, Spevack v. Klein: Milestone or Millstone 
in Bar Discipline!, 53 A.B.A.J. 1121 (1967). For a novel approach, see Buchanan, TIie 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: To What Extent Should It Protect a State Em• 
ployee or Professional Licensee Against the Loss of His State-Created Status?, 'l HousroN 
L. REv. 297 (1970). 
2. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 637 (1896) (Field, J., dissenting), cited in E. GRIS-
WOLD, THE FIFlll A.MEND?.mNT TonAY 8 (1955). 
3. See Spevack. v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 523-25 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Theard v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957); Ginger v. Circuit Court, 372 F.2d 621 (6th Cir. 
1967). Disbarment from practice before the state courts does not automatically result 
in disbarment from practice before the federal courts, although the state proceedings 
are given great weight by the latter. See Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278 (1957), 
Generally, when an attorney admitted in several jurisdictions is disciplined in one, his 
right to practice elsewhere is unaffected in the absence of separate disciplinary proceed-
ings in the other jurisdictions. See Florida Bar v. Wilkes, 179 S,2d 193 (Fla. 1965). 
4. See, e.g., In re Ratner, 194 Kan. 362, 363-64, 399 P.2d 865, 867 (1965); Ratterman 
v. Stapleton, 371 S.W ,2d 939, 940 (Ky, 1963): In re Connor, 207 S.W.2d 492, 494-95 
(Mo. 1948) (court of appeals has sole power to admit and thus inherent power to 
disbar; circuit court has no jurisdiction to disbar). See also Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 
(13 Wall.) 335, 354 (1871); Mattice v. Meyer, 353 F.2d 316, 318 (8th Cir. 1965) (dictum): 
Hertz v. United States, 18 F.2d 52, 54 (8th Cir, 1927). Statutory provisions cannot limit 
the court's inherent power to disbar. In re Bailey, 30 Ariz. 407, 413, 248 P. 29, 31 (1926), 
[84] 
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virtually all disciplinary matters themselves, in more recent times 
the courts have taken the bar into partnership in disciplinary mat-
ters and delegated to it the responsibility for preliminary investiga-
tion and hearing.5 
There has been sharp resistance to the recognition of the attor-
ney's right to remain silent in these proceedings.6 In Cohen v. Hur-
ley,1 the Supreme Court let stand a New York disbarment based on an 
attorney's refusal on self-incrimination grounds to allow examination 
of records relating to his contingent fee cases or to testify at a general 
investigation of ambulance chasing. Although the New York court's 
interpretation of the state privilege was also involved, Cohen was 
grounded in large part upon the then unavailability of the federal 
privilege against self-incrimination in state proceedings. In Malloy 
v. Hogan,8 the Supreme Court changed its position and held that, 
under the fourteenth amendment, the fifth amendment's privilege 
against self-incrimination is also applicable to state proceedings;9 
but Cohen was not expressly overruled. 
An act of the state legislature compelling the court to readmit an attorney was held 
unconstitutional in In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 378, 240 N.W. 441, 443 (1932). See 
generally SPECIAL CoMMITfEE ON EVALUATION OF l;>ISCIPLINARY ENFOR~N';t', AMERICAN 
BAR AssoCIATION, PJ\OBLEMS AND RECOM?IIBNDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 
§ II (1970) [hereinafter CLARK CoM?IU'ITEE REPoRTJ. 
5. Potts, Disbarment Procedure, 24 TEXAS L. REv. 161, 175 (1946). This is not en-
tfrely a modern phenomenon, however. See, e.g., People ex rel. K;irlin v. Culkin, 248 
N,Y. 465,480, 162 N.E. 487, 493 (1928): "In the long :run the power now conceded wjll 
make for the health and honor of the profession and for the protection of the pubUc. 
If the house is to be cleaned, it is for those who occupy and govern it, rather than for 
strangers, to do the noisome work." ln many states there are several stages of investi~-
tion-first by a local bar grievance committee, then by a state bar committee, See 
CLARK CoMllrnTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 30-38. If the charges are not dismissed at 
either of these stages, the attorney under investigation must be given notice of the 
charges and an opportunity to appear at a hearing. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (l968). 
The initial stages of the proces$ are similar jn most states, but the degree of delegation 
of power by the courts in the later stages varies from state to state. In some states the 
entire procedure is administrative; the bar committee's findings and recommendations 
made after the hearing are filed with the state supreme court and become final unless 
the attorney petitions the supreme court for review. E.g., CAL, :Bus. &: PROF, CoDE 
§§ 6078, 6081-8~ (West 1962); FLA. STATE :BA~ !m:EGRATION R. ll,06, 11.09, 32 FJ.,,.. STA.T. 
ANN. (Supp. 1972). In other states, the bar committee must prosecute a suit to have 
discipline imposed by the court. E.g., LA.. STATE :B.u AssN., ARnCI.Es OF ll'iCORP, ai:t. 15, 
§ 6, 21.A. LA. R.Ev. CIV. STA.T. l\Nl'i, (Supp. 1973); N.D. CENT, Com, §§ 27-14-05 to -06 
(1960). ln some states this action is filed in the state supreme court, which refers the 
case to a commissioner for an evjdentiary hearing and a recommendation, E.g., u. 
STATE BM AssN,, ARTICLES OF lNcoRP, art. 15, § 6(b), 21A LA, R.Ev. CIV, STAT, AN.N. (Supp. 
1973); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-14-08 (1960). Other states preserve more unusual proce-
dures; in Texas, for example, the attorney may still request a j1.1ry trial. TEX, R.Ev. 
C1v. STAT. ANN. art. 320a-1, § 5 (1959). In Iowa, the supreme court designates a three-
judge panel to hear the case, and the attorney general prosecutes. IOWA- CODE ANN. 
§§ 610.29-.30 (1950). 
6. See note l supra. 
7. 366 U.S. 117 (1961). 
8. 378 U.S. l (1964). 
9. 378 U.S. at 10-11. 
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In Spevack v. Klein,10 decided just six years after Cohen, a divided 
court did expressly overrule Cohen. It held that an attorney may not 
be disbarred for exercising his privilege against self-incrimination in 
a state disciplinary proceeding. In Spevack, a referee conducting an 
investigation into ambulance chasing on behalf of the appellate divi-
sion of the state court subpoenaed attorney Spevack's records of his 
contingent fee cases. Because Spevack, relying on the federal consti-
tutional privilege against self-incrimination, refused to produce the 
records or to testify, he was disbarred. Although the appellate divi-
sion assumed that the privilege, if available, would be applicable to 
the records, it found that the invocation of the privilege was grounds 
for disbarment.11 As a result, the Supreme Court would not consider 
the question of whether the privilege applied to the records, but fo. 
cused upon the question of whether invoking the privilege could be 
the sole ground for disbarment. 
New York had found that the invocation of the privilege con-
flicted with the attorney's duty to divulge all information pertinent to 
his character and to his fitness to remain a member of the bar.12 
Justice Douglas, writing for four members of the Supreme Court, 
rejected this position on the grounds that (1) the privilege against 
self-incrimination guaranteees the right to remain silent and to " 'suf-
fer no penalty ... for such silence,' "13 and (2) disbarment of an at-
torney who exercises this right is an impermissible penalty.14 The 
plurality stated that, for purposes of the fifth amendment privilege, 
" 'penalty' is not restricted to fine or imprisonment. It means ... the 
imposition of any sanction which makes the assertion of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege 'costly.' "15 Justice Fortas joined the plurality 
in expressly rejecting the contention that the attorney's special re-
sponsibilities necessitated the imposition of certain limitations on 
the privilege against self-incrimination.16 He differed from the plu-
10. 385 U.S. 511 (1967). 
11. The appellate division, relying on Cohen, held that a lawyer, like any citizen, 
may invoke his privilege against self.incrimination and refuse to supply pertinent 
information. In re Spevack, 24 App. Div. 2d 653 (1965). However, "when a lawyer docs 
so be fails in his inherent duty to the court to divulge all pertinent information 
necessary to show his character and fitness to remain a member of the Bar • • • ," 
24 App. Div. 2d at 654. The New York court of appeals affirmed, on the authority of 
Cohen and "on the additional ground that the Fifth Amendment privilege docs not 
apply to a demand, not for oral testimony, but that an attorney produce records re• 
quired by law to be kept by him •••• " In re Spevack, 16 N,Y.2d 1048, 1050, 213 N.E,2d 
457, 457-58, 266 N.Y.S.2d 126, 126 (1965). 
12. 385 U.S. at 514, 516. 
13. 385 U.S. at 514, quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). 
14. 385 U.S. at 516. 
15. 385 U.S. at 515, citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965). 
16. The plurality opinion stated: "We find no room in the privilege against self• 
incrimination for classifications of people so as to deny it to some and extend it to 
others •••• Like the school teacher in Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U,S, 551 
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rality only in that he distinguished the attorney's right to remain 
silent from that of state employees and agents, which, he suggested, 
should be more restricted because of the employees' undivided re-
sponsibility to the state.17 : 
Justice Harlan, dissenting, felt that the majority's decision would 
"be disheartening and frustrating to courts and bar associations 
throughout the country in their efforts to maintain high standards 
at the bar."18 He felt that the majority's approach was too absolutist19 
and argued that the Court had traditionally determined the proper 
scope of the privilege by weighing "the history and purposes of the 
privilege, and the character and urgency of the other public interests , 
involved."20 He noted that the New York rules were reasonably cal-
culated to serve the state's traditional and legitimate effort to ensure 
the high standards of the bar.21 He suggested that Spevack be resolved 
in accordance with cases that permit denial of a status or authority-
such as a commission as a United States Army officer22-to one whose 
claim of the privilege precludes assessment of his qualifications.23 
Justice White, also dissenting,24 felt that the attorney's interests 
would be adequately protected by holding that disclosures made un-
der threat of job loss are inadmissible in subsequent criminal pro-
ceedings, as was done in Spevack' s companion case of Garrity v. 
New ]ersey,25 which involved the prosecution of police officers.26 
In the following year the distinction between attorneys and state 
employees drawn in Justice Fortas' concurrence in Spevack became 
[(1956)], and the policemen in Garrity v. New Jersey, [385 U.S. 493 (1967)] lawyers also 
enjoy first-class citizenship." 385 U.S. at 516. 
17. According to this opinion, a lawyer is not an employee of the state, although 
he is a licensee of the state and an officer of the court. He does not act as an agent for 
the state, and thus his responsibility to the state is limited to obeying "its laws and the 
rules of conduct that it has generally laid down as part of its licensing procedures. 
The special responsibilities that he assumes as licensee of the State and officer of the 
court do not carry with them a diminution, however limited, of his Fifth Amendment 
rights." 385 U.S. at 520 (Fortas, J., concurring). 
18. 385 U.S. at 520-21. 
19. See 385 U.S. at 525. 
20. 385 U.S. at 522-23. 
21. 385 U.S. at 523-25. 
22, Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1952). 
23. 385 U.S. at 525-26. 
24. 385 U.S. at 530-32. 
25. 385 U.S. 493 (1967). 
26. Garrity interpreted the privilege broadly. The Court held that self-incriminating 
disclosures made by police officers in the course of a state investigation of traffic ticket 
fixing under threat of being removed from office if they refused to testify were involun-
tary and therefore inadmissible in a later criminal proceeding. The choice imposed 
on the officers between self-incrimination and job forfeiture was held to be compulsion 
in violation of the fourteenth amendment. 385 U.S. at 496-97. 
88 Michigan Law Review [Vol, 72:84 
one of major importance in Gardner v. Broderick.27 In that case, 
Justice Fortas, ·writing for the majority, appeared to qualify the prin-
ciple announced by Spevack and Garrity. Although the Court re-
versed the dismissal of a New York policeman who had refused to 
waive immunity from criminal prosecution for his testimony before 
the grand jury, as would seem to be required by Garrity, in dictum it 
suggested that the reasoning in Spevack would not be extended to 
cover public employees. Justice Fortas suggested that if the police-
man "had refused to answer questions specifically, directly, and nar-
rowly relating to the performance of his official duties, without being 
required to waive his immunity" he could have been dismissed.28 
Although Justice Fortas carefully distinguished the case of the at-
torney, Justice Harlan, concurring in the result,20 felt that Gardner 
provided a formula that would permit the disbarment of attorneys 
for refusing to answer specific questions relating to their professional 
fitness. 
Spevack itself, although now clearly limited to attorneys, leaves 
several questions regarding the use of the privilege in disbarment 
proceedings unresolved. The first deals with the cases in which an 
attorney may properly claim the privilege: May he claim it when the 
disclosures sought can be sanctioned only by disbarment, rather than 
by traditional criminal penalties? Second, if immunity30 is substi-
tuted for the privilege and disclosure compelled, does the immunity 
prohibit disbarment based on the compelled disclosures? Finally, 
may an attorney be disbarred solely on the basis of inferences of 
wrongdoing or lack of candor when he has exercised the privilege 
during disciplinary proceedings? 
I. MAY THE PRIVILEGE BE CLAIMED WHEN THE CONCEALED 
INFORMATION COULD LEAD ONLY TO DISBARMENT? 
Spevack dealt only with whether an attorney could be disbarred 
for properly invoking the privilege against self-incrimination in a dis-
barment proceeding. The Court did not reach the question of 
whether the privilege is properly invoked when the disclosures in 
question can lead only to disbarment.81 Despite the language of the 
fifth amendment-"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any crimi-
27. 392 U.S. 273 (1968). Accord, Uniform Sanitation Men Assn., Inc. v. Commission 
of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 284 (1968) (companion case). 
28. 392 U.S. at 278. 
29. Uniform Sanitation Men Assn., Inc. v. Commission of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 
285 (1968) (concurring in the result in both cases). 
30. Wigmore defines statutory immunity as amnesty provided by a legislative pro• 
vision "for an individual off ender ••• who shall disclose the facts of the off eme upon 
inquiry [that] is effective to remove the criminality of the offense," 8 J, W1c1110JtE, 
EVIDENCE § 2281, at 491 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (emphasis original), 
31. 385 U.S. at 522 n.l (Harlan, J., dissenting), 
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nal case to be a witness against himsel£"32-the courts have tradition-
ally allowed the assertion of the privilege in civil,88 administrative,34 
and legislative,35 as well as criminal, proceedings. However, although 
the proceeding in which the privilege is asserted need not be criminal, 
the information for which the privilege is claimed must have the 
potential of exposing the speak.er to a criminal or quasi-criminal 
charge.86 
Thus, the question becomes whether disbarment in itself may 
be characterized as a quasi-criminal sanction for purposes of the privi-
lege, The courts have used two approaches to determine which sanc-
tions are criminal and which are civil. The first is to look to prior 
legislative history and judicial applications of the sanction in order 
to determine the appropriate category for all constitutional purposes. 
For example, in Trop v. Dulles,31 the Court relied solely on a test of 
legislative intent: "If the statute imposes a disability for the purposes 
of punishment-that is, to reprimand the wrongdoer, to deter others, 
etc.-it has been considered penal. But a statute has been considered 
nonpenal if it imposes a disability, not to punish, but to accomplish 
some other legitimate govemmental purpose,"88 The Court held that 
a statute that took away the citizenship of a convicted native-born 
American who deserted from the military was penal and thus st1-b-
ject to the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment. 
In Kennedy v. Mendozo-Martinez/'9 the Court focused on prior 
judicial characterizations as well as on legislative history. Both 
sources indicated that the statute in question-which revoked the 
citizenship of individuals who remained outside the United States 
during wartime in order to avoid military service-was intended to 
be a penalty.40 The Court held the statute unconstitutional because 
it imposed such a penalty without a ~minal trial and its accompany-
32. U.S. CoNsr. amend. V, 
33. E.g., McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924). See generally Comment, The 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Civil Litigation, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. ?5; Note, Use 
of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Civil Litigation, 52 VA. J,. REv. 322 (1966), 
34. E.g., ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 478-80 (1894). See generally Sewell, The Self-
Incrimination Clause and Administrative Law, 39 TENN. L. REv. 207 (19?2). 
35. See, e.g., Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 1$0 (1955); Quinn v. United States, 
349 U.S. 155 (1955). 
36. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956), The Court held that the privilege 
against self-incrimination '' 'operates only where a witness is asked to incriminate him-
~elf-in other words, to give testimony which may possibly expose him to a criminal 
charge. But if the criminality has already been taken away, the Amendment ceases to 
apply.' " 350 U,S. at 431, quoting Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 67 (1905) (emphasis 
added). 
37. 356 U.S. 86 (1958), 
38, 356 U.S. at 96. 
39. 372 U.S. 144 (1963). 
40. 372 U.S. at 167. 
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-ing procedural safeguards.41 If this approach is applied, disbarment 
would be characterized as remedial or noncriminal. Traditionally, 
disbarment has in fact been viewed as either civil or sui generis. 
Despite the harsh consequences on the disbarred attorney, the courts 
have defined the purposes of disciplinary proceedings not as punish-
ment, but as protection of the public and promotion of the efficient 
administration of the court system.42 
The Supreme Court, however, has often used a second approach, 
in which the label or characterization placed on proceedings by the 
legislature or the judiciary in other contexts is not conclusive. In-
stead, the court may weigh the " 'precise nature of the government 
function involved as well as ... the private interest that has been 
affected by governmental action.' "43 This method of analysis is 
characteristic of the Court's handling of questions of procedural due 
process generally and has led to the rejection, for example, of the 
labels of "right" and "privilege." 
This was the approach taken by the Court in In re Gault.44 In 
determining whether certain due process safeguards are required 
in the juvenile delinquency setting, the Gault Court expressly dis-
regarded the "'civil' label-of-convenience"45 and considered instead 
the individual and governmental interests involved.40 The Court 
found that, despite the rehabilitative intentions of the founders of 
the juvenile court system,47 the interests of a juvenile are much the 
same as those of an adult criminal defendant.48 In terms of effect on 
the individual, little distinction was found between incarceration in 
a training school and incarceration in a prison,49 or between the 
41. 372 U.S. at 167. 
42. E.g., Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 288 (1882); In re Echeles, 430 F,2d 347, 849 
(7th Cir. 1970); Zitny v. State Bar, 64 Cal. 2d 787, 415 P.2d 521, 57 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1966); 
In re Kahn, 38 App. Div. 2d 115, 124, 328 N.Y.S.2d 87, 96 (1972), 
43. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970), quoting Cafeteria &: Restaurant 
Workers Union v. McEiroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961), 
44. 387 U.S. I (1967). 
45. 387 U.S. at 50. 
46. 387 U.S. at 50•52. 
47. 387 U.S. at 15-17. 
48. 387 U.S. at 50-51. "The absence of substantive standards has not neccssarlly 
meant that ~ildren receive careful, compassionate, individualized treatment. The 
absence of procedural rules based upon constitutional principle has not always pro• 
duced fair, efficient, and effective procedures. Departures from established principles 
of due process have· frequently resulted not in enlightened procedure, but in arbitrari-
ness." 387 U.S. at 18-19. 
49. There is still an institution of whitewashed walls and regimented routine, with 
guards and law-breakers for companions. 387 U.S. at 27. In fact, the penalty for a 
juvenile may be more serious than that for an adult for the same offense. Although the 
juvenile in Gault was committed for a maximum of six years, the maximum punish• 
ment for an adult charged with the same offense (lewd phone calls) was a fine of from 
five to fifty dollars, or imprisonment for not more than two months. 387 U.S. at 29. 
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stigma attached to the determination of delinquency and that at-
tached to the determination of- criminal guilt.1'° In addition, the 
juvenile court may waive jurisdiction and allow trial by the normal 
criminal processes, 51 or may allow the juvenile to be imprisoned 
with adult criminal offenders.52 • 
The Court treated each question of the proper procedure in 
juvenile proceedings independently and held that notice to the juve-
nile and to his parents or guardian, 53 opportunity for confrontation 
and cross-examination, 54 and the assistance of counsel55 were neces-
sary. In a later case, the Court also held that a standard of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt is required.56 
Gault also held that juvenile proceedings are "criminal" for pur-
poses of the privilege against self-incrimination, particularly in 
light of the possible incarceration that could result from the pro-
ceedings: 
It would be entirely unrealistic to carve out of the Fifth Amendment 
all statements by juveniles on the ground that these cannot lead to 
"criminal" involvement. In the first place, juvenile proceedings to 
determine "delinquency," which may lead to commitment to a state 
institution, must be regarded as "criminal" for purposes of the 
privilege against self-incrimination. To hold othenvise would be to 
disregard substance because of the feeble enticement of the "civil" 
label-of-convenience which has been attached to juvenile proceed-
ings. 57 
The balancing approach is flexible. Therefore, a proceeding may 
be found to be sufficiently "criminal" or "penal" to require certain 
procedural safeguards, but not "criminal" for other due process pur-
poses. In fact, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,58 the Court, again using 
the balancing approach, held that trial by jury was not required in 
juvenile proceedings. The plurality opinion focused on the special 
purposes of the juvenile court system and concluded that the pur-
pose and operation of an adjudication of juvenile delinquency are 
50. 387 U.S. at 23-24. 
51. 387 U.S. at 50-51. 
52. 387 U.S. at 50. 
53. 387 U.S. at 31-34. 
54. 387 U.S. at 56-57. 
55. 387 U.S. at 34-42. 
56. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). The Court reiterated the position taken in 
Gault that " 'civil labels and good intentions do not themselves obviate the need for 
criminal due process safeguards in juvenile courts, for [a] proceeding in which the 
issue is whether the child will be found to be "delinquent" and subjected to the loss of 
his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution.'" 397 U.S. at 
365-66, quoting 387 U.S. at 36. 
57. 387 U.S. at 49-50. 
58. 403 U.S. 528 (1971). 
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not identical to those associated with a determination of criminal 
guilt.''9 Jury trial of right would entail uthe traditional delay, the 
formality, and the clamor of the adversary system and, possibly, the 
public trial,"6() while juvenile proceedings are rather to provide an 
"aspect of fairness, of concern, of sympathy, and of paternal atten-
tion.''61 
ln In re Ruffalo,62 the Court treated the characterization of dis-
barment proceedings quite summarily. It stated that "disbarment, 
designed to protect the public, is a punishment or penalty imposed 
on the lawyer."63 As a result, it found that disciplinary proceedings 
are "adversary proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature" so that ade-
quate notice of the charges that might be presented must be given 
before the proceedings begin64 and the charges cannot be amended 
later on the basis of the attorney's testimony. The Court did not 
define the term "quasi-criminal," nor did it specify other require-
ments that may be imposed as a result of this characterization. In 
referring to the proceedings as "quasi-criminal," however, the Court 
did cite-by the use of "Cf."-the case of In re Gault.or. This may 
indicate that the Court feels that the approach adopted in the juve-
nile cases is also appropriate to disbarment. However, many state 
courts have interpreted Ruffalo narrowly and continued to analyze 
disbarment as civil or sui generis for purposes other than notice.66 
The New York court of appeals, for example, commented that Ruf-
falo "hardly stands for an equation of criminal and disciplinary pro-
ceedings, a most unlikely view."67 
Even if the balancing approach is applied, as may have been sug-
gested by Ruffalo, to determine whether disbarment is a criminal 
sanction for the purposes of the fifth amendment privilege, it is not 
clear that the courts will answer the question in the affirmative. 
In the process of balancing the governmental and individual 
interests involved, the courts should consider the purposes68 and 
history of the privilege. Historical development has been particuhirly 
important in defining the scope of the privilege against self-incrimi-
59. 403 U.S. at 550. 
60. 403 U.S. at 550. 
61. 403 U.S. at 550. 
62. 390 U.S. 544 (1968). 
63. 390 U.S. at 550. 
64. 390 U.S. at 551. 
65, 390 U.S. at 551, dting 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967). 
66. See Black v. State Bar, 'l Cal. 3d 676, 687, 499 P.2d 968, 974, 103 Cal. Rptr. 288, 
294 (1972) and cases cited therein. 
67. In Te Kelly, 23 N.Y.2d 368, 384, 244 N.E.2d 456, 466, 296 N.Y.S.2d 937, 951 (1968). 
68. The Court has defined the limits of the privilege as being "as broad as the 
mischief against which it seeks to guard." Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 
562 (1892), 
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nation: "The privilege ... is a specific provision of which it is pecu-
liarly true that 'a page of history is worth a volume of logic.' "69 It 
initially developed as a resistance to the oath ex officio of the ecclesi-
astical courts of England.70 The oath was made in ignorance of the 
charges or evidence against the speak.er and consisted of a sworn 
statement that he would give truthful answers to any questions that 
might be asked. 71 The questions that followed were designed to 
compel a confession.72 
Initial opposition to the oath took the form of criticism of the 
lack of a proper presentment or accusation.73 Broader objections, in-
cluding the claim that the oath subjected an individual to the cruel 
trilemma of contempt, perjury, or conviction, were raised later.74 
In 1641, when the court of High Commission was abolished, the 
maxim nemo tenetur seipsum prodere-no man is bound to produce 
against himself-was recognized.75 This common law privilege was 
eventually embodied in the fifth amendment.76 · 
Despite the fact that the privilege is acknowledged to be " 'one 
of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized' "77 
and a "hallmark of our democracy,"78 today there is no general agree-
ment about either its basic purpose or its extent.79 Wigmore identi-
fied as many as twelve suggested purposes80 and stated that this 
diversity results from the fact that the privilege is "many things in 
as many settings"81-it is not only the prerogative of the defendant 
not to take the stand in a criminal trial82 but also the option of any 
witness to refuse to disclose incriminating evidence in a criminal 
69. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956), quoting New York Trust 
Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921). 
70. L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIF111 .AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINsr SELF-INCRIM• 
!NATION 60-82 (1968); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 30, § 2250. 
71. L. LEVY, supra note 70, at 46-47. 
72. Id. at 47, 50. 
73. Ellis, Vox Populi -u. Suprema Lex: A Comment on the Testimonial Privilege of 
the Fifth Amendment, 55 IowA L. R.Ev. 829, 834 (1970). 
74. See id. at 834-35; L. LEVY, supra note '70, at 103. 
75. L. LEVY, supra note 70, at 96. 
76. E. GRISWOLD, supra note 2, at 2-7. 
77. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956), quoting E. GRISWOLD, supra 
note 2, at 7. 
78. United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 582 (2d Cir.) (Frank, J., dissenting), 
revd., 353 U.S. 391 (1957). 
79. Murphy v. Waterfront Commn., 378 U.S. 52, 56 n.5 (1964), quoting Kalven, 
Invoking the Fifth Amendment-Some Legal and Impractical Considerations, 9 Buu.. 
ATOMIC SCI. 181, 182 (1953). 
80. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 30, § 2251. 
81. Id. § 2251, at 296. 
82. The defendant may choose not to take the stand, and if he does so choose, the 
prosecution may not oomment upon his failure to testify in his own behalf. Griffin v. 
California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
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or civil case or in a proceeding before an administrative board or 
legislative committee. 83 
The Supreme Court has recognized that there are a number of 
policies underlying the privilege against self-incrimination: 
our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel 
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for 
an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal jus-
tice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by 
inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates 
"a fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to leave 
the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him 
and by requiring the government in its contest with the individual 
to shoulder the entire load," ... our respect for the inviolability of 
the human personality and of the right of each individual "to a pri-
vate enclave where he may lead a private life," ... our distrust of 
self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the privilege, 
while sometimes "a shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection to 
the innocent."84 
In fact, the Court has acknowledged that the privilege serves so many 
fundamental values that it constitutes a "reflection of our common 
conscience. "85 
Out of this complex, the Court has singled out several related 
values that appear to be central. It has emphasized that the privilege 
is founded on a fear that statements made under compulsion will 
be unreliable86 and on a fear that oppressive or cruel prosecutorial 
methods might be used to compel self-incriminatory statements.87 
Most fundamentally, however, the privilege is intended to pre-
serve the integrity of a judicial system in which even the guilty are 
not to be convicted unless the prosecution "shoulders the entire 
load"88 and to preserve the "individual's substantive right . . . 'to 
a private enclave where he may lead a private life ... .' "89 The Court 
has gathered the various policies into "one overriding thought": "the 
83. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 47 (1967); Murphy v. Waterfront Commn., 378 U.S. 52, 9-i 
(1964) (White, J., concurring). 
84. Murphy v. Waterfront Commn., 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). 
85. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 9 n.7 (1964), quoting E. Gruswow, supra note 2, 
at 73. 
86. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 44-48 (1967). 
87. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445-55 (1966); Brown v. Walker, 161 
U.S. 591, 596-97 (1896). Cf. E. GRISWOLD, supra note 2, at 7-8. But see McKay, Self• 
Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 SUP. CT. R.Ev. 193, 206-14. See generally 8 J. 
WrnMoRE, supra note 30, § 2251, at 315-16. 
88. Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415 (1966). 
89. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966), quoting United States v. Grune• 
wald, 233 F.2d 556, 579, 581-82 (2d Cir.) (Frank, J., dissenting), revd., 353 U.S. 391 
(1957). See McKay, supra note 87, at 210. 
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respect a government-state or federal-must accord to the dignity 
and integrity of its citizens."90 · 
A court using th~ balancing approach determines which govern-
mental and individual interests should-in light of the policies un-
derlying the privilege-be given weight. The state's interest in com-
pelling disclosure stems from its need to protect the judicial system 
and the public from those unqualified to practice as attorneys. The 
attorney's dual role as officer of the court91 and fiduciary of his client92 
requires that he be trustworthy and conform to a higher ethical stan-
dard than that required of other citizens.93 Disbarment may thus be 
regarded, not as punishment, but as an inevitable consequence of the 
loss of an attribute necessary to fulfill the attorney's responsibilities. 
In addition, it has been suggested that the position of an attorney 
as an officer of the court carries with it a special duty of frankness and 
candor in relations with the court.94 This duty is thought to require 
full and honest cooperation with any inquiry into the fitness of mem-
bers of the bar, even where it calls into question the attorney's own 
fitness.96 Thus, an invocation of the privilege that hinders a court's 
investigation has been viewed by some courts as inconsistent with an 
attorney's role.90 It is feared that judicial abandonment of the prin-
ciple of scrupulous honesty and candor will gradually lead to the 
lowering of the high ethical standards required of attorneys.97 It has 
also been suggested that the well-known requirement that attorneys 
disclose all information relative to their fitness has discouraged those 
who might otherwise have sought to become attorneys in order to 
exploit the judicial system or individual clients98 and that any rejec-
90. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966). 
91. See, e.g., Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957); Ex parte Wall, 107 
U.S. 267, 288 (1883); Ex parte Griffith, 278 Ala. 344, 348, 178 S.2d 169, 174 (1965), 
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 988 (1966); White v. Sadler, 350 Mich. 511, 525-26, 87 N.W.2d 
192, 200 (1958); State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 411, 217 A.2d 441, 447 (1966). 
92. See, e.g., Cole supra note 1, at 820-21. 
93. Cathey, supra note 1, at 362. See generally AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION, CODE OF 
PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY (1970). 
94. In re Alkow, 64 Cal. 2d 838, 841, 415 P.2d 800, 802, 51 Cal. Rptr. 912, 914 
(1966); H. DRINKER, LEGAL Ennes 74-76 (1953). 
95. In re Fenn, 235 Mo. App. 24, 35, 128 S.W.2d 657, 664-65 (1939); In re Cohen, 
7 N.Y.2d 488, 495-97, 166 N.E.2d 672, 675-77, afjd. sub. nom. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 
U.S. 117 (1961). 
96. Such a failure of responsibility constituted the sole ground of Spevack.'s dis-
barment in the decisions of the referee and of the New York trial court. In re Spevack., 
24 App. Div. 2d 653 (1965). 
97. Justice Harlan warned of the danger of encouraging "oncoming generations of 
lawyers to think of their calling as imposing on them no higher standards of behavior 
than might be acceptable in the general marketplace." Spevack. v. Klein, 385 U.S. 5ll, 
521 (1967) (dissenting opinion). See also Undenvood, supra note 1, at 136. 
98. Underwood, supra note 1, at 135. 
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tion of the requirement of disclosure might encourage these individu-
als to seek admission to the bar.99 
Moreover, the attorney's exercise of the privilege against self-
incrimination may place a substantial additional burden on the en-
forcement of bar discipline, which at present depends heavily on the 
attorney's voluntary cooperation. Despite the great public interest in 
bar discipline, present procedures have proved to be ineffective in 
identifying and sanctioning attorneys who misuse their position. For 
example, a 1966 New York study found that only 2 per cent of the 
attorneys who violated generally acceptable ethical norms were pro-
cessed by the disciplinary machinery and that less than .2 per cent 
were officially sanctioned.100 A 1970 American Bar Association com-
mittee report on disciplinary enforcement indicated the existence 
of "a scandalous situation that requires the immediate attention of 
the entire profession."101 As a result, pressure is building, both inside 
the bar102 and from the general public,103 to rid the profession of at-
torneys who abuse their prerogatives and neglect their responsibili-
ties. It has repeatedly been suggested that, if reform does not come 
quickly from within, it ·will be imposed from without.104 
At present, disciplinary committees must rely primarily on com-
plaints from laymen to initiate actions106 and often lack the profes-
sional staff and finances required for extensive investigations.100 Thus, 
one of the few resources now available to the disciplinary machinery 
is the attorney's own testimony and records. Moreover, much of the 
information relative to the attorney's conduct will be within his own 
control.107 In such circumstances the attorney's refusal to provide evi-
dence or to testify on the ground that the information disclosed may 
lead to his disbarment could make effective bar discipline impossible. 
Moreover, the bar committees and the courts are often too solici-
tous of the individual attorney's interest. The record seems to indi-
cate, not unjustified prosecutions, but a failure to enforce discipline 
99. Id. 
100. J. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICS 170 (1966). 
101. CLARK Comrrrnm REPORT, supra note 4, at I. "[T)he present enforcement 
structure is failing to rid the profession of a substantial number of malefactors." Id, 
at 2-3. 
102. See, e.g., id. at 1-8; Frand<, New Life for Lawyer Self-Discipline: The Disci-
plinary Report of the Clark Committee, 54 JUDICATURE 383 (1971); Wright, Self-
Discipline of the Bar: Theory or Fact?, 57 A.B.A.J. 757 (1971); Note, Achieving Effective 
Bar Discipline, 6 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 974 (1972); Note, Legal Ethics and Professionalism, 
79 YALE L.J. 1179, 1179-80 (1970). 
103. Burger, A Sick Profession?, 5 TULSA L.J. 1, 1-2 (1968). 
104. See, e.g., CLARK ComrrrrEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 8-9. 
105. Id. at 60-66. See id. •at 52-53. 
106. Id. at 19-23. 
107. Niles & Kaye, supra note 1, at 1123. 
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stringently enough.108 In this context, procedural safeguards seem 
less crucial than in the area of criminal law enforcement. 
Further, it might be argued that allowing an attorney to invoke 
the privilege when the compelled disclosures could lead to disbar-
ment would eventually justify the invocation of the privilege when 
disclosures could lead to denial of admission to the bar.109 This con-
clusion results naturally from the Court's tendency to treat disbar-
ment and admissions cases as indistinguishable for purposes of impos-
ing requirements of procedural due process.11° Since present bar 
resources are inadequate to fund independent investigations of even 
the relatively small number of disciplinary proceedings that arise,111 
extensive inquiry into the qualifications of the many applicants to 
the bar would be impossible. This would expose the court "to the 
possible indignity that it may one day have to admit to its own bar 
... a lawyer [ suspected of misconduct who has thwarted "official in-
quiry] unless it can somehow get at t}J.e truth of suspicions, the in-
vestigation of which the applicant has previously succeeded in block-
ing. "112 
In contrast to the state's urgent need for information relating to 
an attorney's fitness, the individual attorney has a strong interest in 
nondisclosure. Despite the fact that the courts do not intend disbar-
ment to operate as a punishment, it has severe effects upon the indi-
vidual attorney, whose practice is his means of livelihood. As the 
Second Circuit commented when considering a petition for injunctive 
relief against state disciplinary proceedings on the ground that the 
proceedings violated an attorney's civil rights: "A lawyer is not 
usually motivated solely by the prospect of monetary gain in seeking 
admission to the bar or in practicing his chosen profession. However, 
it cannot be disputed that for most attorneys the license to practice 
law represents their livelihood, the loss of which may be greater 
punishment than a monetary fine. "113 
In addition, the attorney's practice represents a substantial invest-
ment of time, money, and energy. Justice Black noted: 
108. CLARK COMMIITEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 24-26, 167-71. 
109. Indeed, this argument has been made. See Underwood, supra note I, at 134-35. 
110. In Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 213 (1961), the Court stated, "The fact that 
such refusal [to answer bar committee questions under claim of a constitutional 
privilege] was here made a ground for disbarment, rather than for denial of admission 
to the bar, as in Konigsberg and Anastaplo, is not of constitutional moment." In 
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957), the Court stated the 
rationale of the case in terms equally applicable to admissions or disbarment pro-
ceedings: "A State cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or from any other 
occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal Pro-
tection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment." 
111. See, e.g., text accompanying note 100 supra. 
112. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 521 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
113. Erdmann v. Stevens, 458 F.2d 1205, 1209-10 (2d Cir. 1972). 
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The la,;vyer's abilities, acquired through long and expensive educa-
tion, and the goodwill attached to his practice, acquired in part 
through uncompensated services, are capital assets that belong to the 
Ia,vyer .... 
These assets should be no more subject to confiscation than his 
home or any other asset he may have acquired through his industry 
and initiative.114 
Not only does the sanction of disbarment permanently prevent the 
attorney from utilizing this investment and earning his livelihood, 
but it also deprives him of his professional and personal reputation.m 
As in Gault,116 disbarment, even if not intended to be punitive, 
creates a stigma that is scarcely distinguishable from that resulting 
from a criminal conviction. 
It should be emphasized that the interests involved in disbarment 
can be distinguished from those involved in admissions proceedings. 
Although denial of admission also has a harsh effect on one who has 
spent three years and a large sum to complete his legal education,117 
this loss is less severe than that suffered by an established member of 
the bar, who has a greater investment of time and money and incurs 
the greater dishonor of having to leave professional life abruptly. 
Moreover, despite the tendency to equate the two proceedings,118 
the courts have traditionally drawn a distinction between disbarment 
and admissions in the placement of burden of proof. The applicant 
for admission to the bar generally has the burden of proving his fit-
ness to serve as an attorney.119 However, once he has satisfactorily 
established his educational qualifications and good character and has 
been admitted, the state bears the burden of proving misconduct or 
lack of the required good character in order to disbar him.120 Al-
though the maintenance of good character is an attorney's continuing 
obligation, it would be unreasonable to require him repeatedly to 
produce evidence of his fitness. Thus, even though disbarment pro-
114. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 146 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting). 
115. 366 U.S. at 147 (Black, J., dissenting). 
116. See text accompanying note 50 supra. 
117. "While ·this [the bar admissions proceeding] is not a criminal case, its conse• 
quences-for Konigsberg take it out of the ordinary run of civil cases. The Committee's 
action prevents him from earning a living by practicing law. This deprivation has 
grave consequences for a man who has spent years of study and a great deal of money 
in preparing to be a lawyer." Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1957), 
118. See text accompanying note 110 supra. 
119. See, e.g., In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 85-90 (1961): Konigsberg v. State Dar, 
366 U.S. 36, 40-42 (1961) and cases cited therein; Application of Levine, 97 Ariz. 88, 91, 
397 P .2d 205, 207 (1964): H. DRINKER, supra note 94, at 46. The inquiry is more limited 
in the area of beliefs and associations, which are protected by the first amendment. 
See, e.g., In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23, 30 (1971); Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1, 6 (1971). 
CJ. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971), 
120. In re Fisher, 179 F.2d 361, 363, cert, denied, 340 U.S. 825 (1950); Roark v. State 
Bar, 5 Cal. 2d 665, 668, 55 P.2d 839, 841 (193'6); H. DRINKER, supra note 94, at 43, 
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ceedings, like admissions proceedings, raise the question of the attor-
ney's qualifications, his good character as established at the time of 
his a~mission is presumed. As in a criminal proceeding, the privilege 
to remain silent is consistent with the state's obligation to prove mis-
conduct, for the purpose of the privilege is to force the state, in an 
adversary system, to bear its rightful burden of proof when it seeks 
to impose a harsh sanction.121 In admissions proceedings, on the 
other hand, the privilege of remaining silent is difficult to reconcile 
with the individual's obligation to prove his fitness. If the scope of 
the privilege is extended this far, an individual could, by a claim of 
privilege, shift the burden to the state to justify not finding him 
qualified. 
The interest of the individual attorney in the protection provided 
by the privilege against self-incrimination is particularly important 
in view of the fact that the bar's attempt to ensure high ethical stan-
dards through self-regulation has produced a uniquely inbred system. 
Other professions also conduct preliminary investigations and disci-
plinary hearings,122 which are subject to judicial review.123 However, 
only bar disciplinary proceedings are conducted entirely by members 
of the party's own profession from investigation through final judicial 
review. While this situation may actually produce laxness in disciplin-
ing personal friends and associates,124 it also allows participation by 
individuals who have a personal interest in and knowledge of the pro-
fession and may be biased against the individual under investigation, 
either by personal animosity or by their competitive relationship.125 
Procedural safeguards are thus particularly necessary to ensure fair-
ness in attorney disciplinary proceedings. Certainly the majority of 
disciplinary proceedings are neither ill-founded nor unfairly han-
121. See text accompanying notes 88-90 supra. 
122. For example, in Ohio the state boards of accountancy, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. 
§ 4701.02 (Page Supp. 1972): architecture, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4703.01 (Page 1954): 
dentistry, OHIO REv. CODE ANN.§ 4715.02 (Page 1954); and pharmacy, OHIO REv. CODE 
ANN. § 4729.01 (Page Supp. 1972), are composed of members of these respective pro• 
fessions. The boards have the authority to suspend or revoke licenses to practice: OHIO 
REv. CODE ANN. § 4701.16 (Page Supp. 1972) (accountants); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. 
§ 4703.15 (Page Supp. 1972) (architects); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4715.30, .36 (Page 
1954), as amended, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4715.36 (Page Supp. 1972) (dentists); OHio 
REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4729.16-.17 (Page 1954), as amended, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4729.16-
.17 (Page Supp. 1972) (pharmacists). 
123. See, e.g., Doelker v. Accountancy Bd., 12 Ohio St. 2d 76, 232 N.E.2d 407 (1967). 
In many situations review is constitutionally required. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 381-89 (1965). 
124. CLARK COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 24-26, 167-71. 
125. In Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 148 n.37 (1961), Justice Black noted in his 
dissent that "[t]he true nature of the underlying controversy in this case, as a contro-
versy between economically competing groups of.lawyers is shown by the fact that four 
different associations of attorneys filed briefs as amici curiae in the present proceed-
ings-two favorable to petitioner and two favorable to respondent." 
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dled.126 Nevertheless, history indicates that these proceedings may 
be misused.127 Moreover, it is foreign to our constitutional system to 
force any individual to rely on the good faith of others to ensure his 
basic freedoms. 
It should also be mentioned that classifying disbarment as quasi-
criminal has a practical advantage in that the determination of 
whether criminal prosecution is a substantial possibility need not be 
made,128 for the likelihood that the compelled disclosure would lead 
to disbarment would be sufficient. 
Once the competing interests are established, the court must bal-
ance those of the individual against the state. In doing this, the court 
should give careful consideration to the attorney's special responsi-
bilities. Despite its recognition that the state's concern is vital, the 
majority in Spevack expressly rejected the contention that an attorney 
is under any special disability as regards his protected right to silence. 
As the plurality in Spevack stated, "Like the schoolteacher . • • and 
the policemen ... lawyers also enjoy first-class citizenship."129 How-
ever, this does not necessarily mean that the Court will go so far as 
to find that disbarment is a quasi-criminal sanction for purposes of 
the fifth amendment privilege. Such an interpretation, if our reason-
ing to this point is correct, would prohibit disbarment on the basis 
of information disclosed under compulsion even though the infor-
mation in question could not lead to a traditional criminal sanction. 
In contrast, the Court suggested in Gardner that public employees 
in an analogous situation could be dismissed.130 
Furthermore, the Court's attitude toward the attorney's role may 
have been modified with the changes on the Court since Spevack.131 
Its new members may return to the position advocated by Justice 
Harlan, who placed primary emphasis on the protection of the high 
126. Cf. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 159 
(1971); In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23, 36 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
127. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 140-41, 144-45 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); 
Comment, Controlling Lawyers by Bar Assodations and Courts, 5 HARV, Civ. RIGHTS• 
Civ. LIB. L. REv. 301, 301-03, 308-14 (1970). 
128. The privilege against self-incrimination applies to answers that would furnish 
a link in a chain needed to prosecute the claimant as well as to answers that arc 
sufficient in themselves to support a conviction. The court must determine for itself 
whether the witness has "reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer." 
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951). "To sustain the privilege, it need 
only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is 
asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot 
be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result." Hoffman v. 
United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951). 
129. 385 U.S. at 516. 
130. See text accompanying notes 27-28 supra. 
131. Two members of the plurality (Chief Justice Warren and Justice Black), two 
members of the dissent Gustices Harlan and Clark), and Justice Fortas, whose concur-
rence distinguished attorneys from other state employees, have left the Court since 
Spevack. 
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standards of the bar.132 Or the new members might accept the view 
suggested by Justice Black in his dissent in Cohen. This view recog-
nizes that the state needs information pertaining to the fitness of 
attorneys but gives more weight to the notion that it is particularly 
important that attorneys, precisely because of their important public 
role, retain all their constitutional rights and safeguards: 
[T]he important role that lawyers are called upon to play in our 
society would make it all the more imperative that they not be dis-
criminated against with regard to the basic freedoms that are de-
signed to protect the individual against the tyrannical exertion of 
governmental power. For, in my judgment, one of the great purposes 
underlying the grant of those freedoms was to give independence to 
those who must discharge important public responsibilities. The legal 
profession, ·with responsibilities as great as those placed upon any 
group in our society, must have that independence. If it is denied 
them, they are likely to become nothing more than parrots of the 
views of whatever group wields governmental power at the mo-
ment.133 
Further, an attorney's reliance on the protection of the Constitu-
tion, even if it has the effect of hindering the court's investigation 
of his fitness, should not be viewed as inconsistent with his role as an 
officer of the court. It seems inappropriate for a court to classify an 
insistence that it respect a right granted by the Constitution as a 
breach of duty to that court.134 
Recent cases suggest that the Court, in evaluating the weight 
of an individual's interests, has rejected the use of such labels as 
"right" and "privilege"135 and will inquire instead as to whether the 
individual's interest has become "vested" and thus must be balanced 
against the needs of the state.136 This approach has been used by the 
Court in determining that welfare benefits are a matter of statutory 
entitlement to those qualified to receive them137 and that constitu-
tional safeguards are therefore applicable to benefit revocation. Like-
wise, the Court has distinguished between the interests of two types 
of nontenured schoolteachers on this basis. In the case of an individ-
ual who alleged only that he was hired on a one-year contract, proce-
dural due process was inapplicable where the state failed to rehire 
him.138 But in the case of a teacher who alleged in addition an in-
132. See 385 U.S. at 521. 
133. 366 U.S. at 138. 
134. See Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 133 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). 
135. E.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 
(1972). 
136. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 
262 (1970); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 n.5 (1957). 
137. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-62 (1970). 
138. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
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formal tenure system, which justified his expectations of continued 
employment, the state was required to provide him with notice and 
an opportunity for a hearing to contest the failure to rehire him.189 
The attorney's right to practice should also be considered to be a 
matter of entitlement to an individual once he has demonstrated 
that he has the legal education and good character required for ad-
mission to the bar.140 Thus, although many courts have character-
ized the attorney's interest in continuing to practice as a privilege,141 
this interest should be protected by constitutional safeguards.142 
Assuming that the attorney's interest is "vested" in this way, 
there are strong arguments in favor of classifying disbarment as a 
quasi-criminal sanction. Such a classification would forward many 
of the policies behind the privilege against self-incrimination.143 
This would result in an accusatorial, rather than an inquisitorial form 
of proceeding and would preserve an individual-state balance in 
which the state is required to "shoulder the entire load" when seek-
ing to impose a severe sanction. It would protect the privacy of the 
individual from groundless intrusion by the state. It would force the 
state to refrain from putting the individual to the kind of impossible 
choice posed by the traditional "cruel trilemma."144 To the extent 
that the privilege shields the innocent and filters out inherently un-
reliable statements made under compulsion, it would serve this func-
tion in disciplinary proceedings, where the distorting pressure of 
compulsion may be as strong as it is in many criminal trials. 
Further, the history and purpose of the privilege suggest that the 
public need for disclosure is not as strong here as it would be in a 
139. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). 
140. Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1, 8 (1971). An attorney is entitled to hold his office 
during good behavior. In re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 54 N.E. 646 (1899); State ex rel. Foster v. 
Washington State Bar Assn., 23 Wash. 2d 800, 162 P.2d 261 (1945). The right to practice 
is revocable only for good cause shown at a legal proceeding. Randall v. Brigham, 74 
U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868). But see Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1971) (Dlackmun, 
J., dissenting). · 
141. E.g., Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957). Cardozo's opinion in 
In re Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 84-85, 116 N.E. 782, 783 (1917), cert. denied, 246 U.S. 661 
(1918), is the classic statement of this theory: 
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A fair private 
and professional character is one of them. Compliance with that condition is 
essential at the moment of admission; but it is equally essential afterwards •• , • 
Whenever the condition is broken, the privilege is lost .••• To strike the unworthy 
lawyer from the roll is not to add to the pains and penalties of crime. The exam-
ination into character is renewed; and the test of fitness is no longer satisfied. For 
these reasons courts have repeatedly said that disbarment is not punishment. 
The privilege theory was also applied to physicians in Barsky v. Board of Regents, 
347 U.S. 442 (1954), where a physician's license was suspended for failure to turn over 
records of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee to the House Un-American Activ, 
ities Committee. 
142. Cf. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957). 
143. For a discussion of these policies, see text accompanying notes 77-90 supra. 
144. See text accompanying note 74 supra. 
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criminal proceeding. In the criminal trial, although there isi a com-
pelling necessity for disclosure both because of the seriousness of 
criminal conduct and because of the high standard of proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt, the privilege is fully extended under the fifth 
amendment. In disbarment proceedings, where the st,ate :hears a 
lower burden of proof,145 the public need for compelled testimony 
appears to be no greater. The privilege guarantees that the individu-
al's interest will be protected even at the expense of lowered state 
efficiency. As in the case of criminal law enforcement,, the state's 
vital interest in attorney discipline suggests a need for a reallocation 
of resources to permit efficient discipline, rather than a narrowing of 
constitutional rights, for, although disbarment is intended to be re-
medial, rather than punitive, some courts have found that it is a more 
severe sanction than a short period of imprisonment.146 At least one 
member of the present Court has recognized that some noncriminal 
sanctions have such a serious effect on an individual that due process 
requires that certain procedural safeguards generally associated with 
criminal trials be observed before the sanction is applied. In a con-
curring opinion in Argersinger v. Hamlin,147 Justice Powell pointed 
out that, to an individual whose job requires driving, deprivation of 
a driver's license is a more serious consequence than a brief stay in 
jail.148 He argued that court-appointed counsel is required by due 
process, not only when imprisonment may be imposed, but in all 
cases where the "deprivation of property rights and interests is. of 
sufficient consequence" and the indigent is capable of defending him-
self.149 The sanction of permanent disbarment is even more serious 
than deprivation of one's driver's license, because it forecloses all job 
opportunities in the attorney's field of training, at least in his ·home 
state.150 
There is clear precedent for the clc1.ssification of serious nonim-
prisonment sanctions as criminal or penal for the purposes of various 
con~titutional safeguards. In certain situations loss of citizenship,151 
disqualification from the clergy,152 permanent exclusion from, public 
employment,153 and even exclusion from the federal bar154 have all 
been held to be penal for constitu~onal purposes. · · 
145. See text accompanying note 179 infra. 
146. See text accompanying note 113 supra. 
147. 407 U.S. 25, 44-66 (1972). 
148. 407 U.S. at 48. 
149. 407 U.S. at 48. 
150. Disbarment by a state court does not automatically result in disbarment from 
federal court or from other state courts. See note 3 supra. 
151. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
152. Cummings v. Missouri, '71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866). 
153. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946). 
154. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866). 
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Additionally, the juvenile analogy from Gault provides a prece-
dent for extending the term "quasi-criminal" to cover disbarment.ir;r; 
Although the Gault reasoning suggests that disbarment, like juvenile 
delinquency proceedings, may be quasi-criminal for purposes of the 
privilege against self-incrimination, the California supreme court 
recently seems to have rejected this analogy in Black v. State Bar.m 
That court held that an attorney in a disbarment case does not 
have the right of a criminal defendant to refuse to testify at all. 
Gault was distinguished on the grounds that disbarment proceed-
ings, unlike juvenile delinquency proceedings, cannot result in 
incarceration and that those sanctions that are imposed are designed 
only to protect the courts and the public, not to punish.m 
This method of distinguishing Gault, although justified to some 
extent by that case's emphasis on loss of liberty in its discussion of 
the privilege against self-incrimination,1G8 ignores the wider scope of 
the Court's analysis. The Gault opinion, taken as a whole, describes 
a series of factors-in addition to involuntary confinement-that are 
common to criminal and juvenile proceedings; these include the 
attendant social stigma159 and the availability of the juvenile's record 
to law enforcement agencies, the Armed Forces, social service agen-
cies, and private employers.160 
Other cases dealing with the privilege against self-incrimination 
indicate that incarceration is not a prerequisite for the operation of 
the privilege. As early as 1886 the Supreme Court held, in Boyd v. 
United States,161 that the privilege against self-incrimination pro-
hibited compulsory production of goods and papers in a nominally 
civil forfeiture proceeding based on an alleged violation of the cus-
toms laws. The Court held that the owner of the goods could not be 
forced to incriminate himself simply because the prosecutor decided 
to forgo a criminal prosecution and sue in rem for the goods.162 It 
noted that the forfeiture and the traditionally criminal sanctions were 
penalties for the same criminal act.168 The Court concluded that "[a]s, 
therefore, suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred by the commis-
sion of offences against the law, are of this quasi-criminal nature, we 
think that they are within the reason of criminal proceedings for all 
the purposes ... of that portion of the Fifth Amendment which de-
155. See text accompanying notes 44-57 supra. 
156. 7 Cal. 3d 676, 499 P.2d 968, 103 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1972). 
157. 7 Cal. 3d at 688, 499 P.2d at 974, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 294. 
158 • .387 U.S. at 49-50. 
159. 387 U.S. at 24. 
160. 387 U.S. at 24-25. 
161. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
162. 116 U.S. at 634. 
163. 116 U.S. at 634. 
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dares that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself .... "164 
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed Boyd in United States v. 
United States Coin & Currency165 and announced: "From the rele-
vant constitutional standpoint there is no difference between a man 
who 'forfeits' $8,674 because he has used the money in illegal gam-
bling activities and a man who pays a 'criminal fine' of $8,674 as a re-
sult of the same course of conduct. In both instances, money liability 
is predicated upon a finding of the owner's wrongful conduct; in both 
cases, the Fifth Amendment applies with equal force."166 The for-
feiture proceedings were characterized as criminal although, theo-
retically, the individuals who had fraudulently failed to pay the 
customs fees or used the money in gambling were not even parties to 
the actions, which had been brought against the goods themselves. 
However, juvenile and forfeiture proceedings differ from disbar-
ment in an important respect. The main distinction between Gault, 
Boyd, and United States Coin & Currency, on the one hand, and dis-
barment proceedings, on the other, is that the civil remedy sought 
by the state in the former cases was, in effect, an alternative to a crimi-
nal sanction. In Boyd, the customs act167 provided for a forfeiture, 
proceeding in addition to either fine or imprisonment;168 the prose-
cutor waived the indictment and instituted a court action for the 
goods.169 In United States Coin & Currency, the statute provided that 
no property rights existed in property "intended for use in violating 
the provisions of the internal revenue laws."170 The forfeiture of the 
money to be used in gambling was thus the practical equivalent of a 
fine for the gambling itself.171 In Gault the court noted that a state 
juvenile court may waive jurisdiction and allow the child to be tried 
as an adult.172 The effect of these cases is to refuse to allow the state, 
by electing a nominally civil proceeding, to impose a punishment for 
a criminal act while denying the accused the protection of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination. 
The Court may seize upon this distinction between disbarment 
proceedings, on the one hand, and juvenile and forfeiture proceed-
ings, on the other, and refuse to extend the scope of the privilege to 
cover disbarment, for cases dealing with the privilege against self-
164. 116 U.S. at 634-35. 
165. 401 U.S. 715 (1971). 
166. 401 U.S. at 718. ~ 
167. Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 391, 18 Stat. 186. 
168. Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 391, § 12, 18 Stat. 186. 
169. 116 U.S. at 634. 
170. INT, REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7302. 
171. See text accompanying note 166 supra, 
l72. 3S7 v.s. gt 50-5J. 
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incrimination indicate that, despite the fundamental status of the 
privilege, the Court has been willing to weigh state interests heav-
ily.173 In fact, in several cases the Court has expressly noted that the 
privilege against self-incrimination "has never been given the full 
scope which the values it helps to protect suggest."174 
Moreover, in questions involving bar proceedings the Supreme 
Court has deferred to the states in the interest of federalism. The con-
cept of local control of the bar was firmly established in England17G 
and has received continued support in the United States.17° In the 
area of bar admissions,177 for example, the Court has been persuaded 
by the states' concern for the integrity of their legal process and has 
on this basis upheld questionable admissions procedures against first 
amendment challenges.178 Since each state's interest in the integrity 
of its own judicial system demands effective regulation of the bar, a 
federally imposed interpretation of the privilege that constrains the 
states' disciplinary machinery may constitute unwarranted interfer-
ence with matters of legitimate local concern. 
Despite the strength of an individual attorney's interest and the 
similarity of this interest to other interests previously held quasi-
criminal, on balance it seems fair to say that the Court will be very 
reluctant to find disbarment to be quasi-criminal if doing so neces-
sarily precludes effective bar discipline. However, the vital impor-
tance of the individual interests in this area suggest that the conflict 
would be better resolved if a method could be devised whereby effec-
tive bar discipline could be achieved without the sacrifice of the 
individual's interests. 
A partial resolution might be reached if more resources could 
be committed to bar discipline, for the bar could then make a more 
extensive independent investigation and utilize methods that do not 
require the cooperation and testimony of the accused. For example, 
173. See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972): California v. Byers, 402 
U.S. 424 (1971); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). 
174. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 762 (1966), quoted in Spevack v. Klein, 
385 U.S. 511, 522 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Similar language can be found in 
California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 449 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
175. See 2 w. HOLDSWORTH, A HisrORY OF ENGLISH LAW 311-19, 493-506 (4th ed. 
1936). See generally H. COHEN, A HisroRY OF THE ENGLISH BAR AND ATIORNATUS TO 
1450 (1929). 
176. See Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957). See also C. WARREN, A 
HlsroRY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 39-143 (1911), 
177. Justice Harlan noted that bar admissions practices are "an area of federal-state 
relations ••• into which [federal courts] should be especially reluctant and slow to 
enter." Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 276 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
178. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971); 
In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957). See 
Note, The Constitutionality of State Residency Requirements for Admission to the 
Bar, 71 Mica. L. REv. 838, 841-42 (1973). But see Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. I (1971); 
In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971). 
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in many cases the attorney represents his client in dealings with third 
parties, such as the court or the opposing parties in a case. In these 
situations the other parties could be contacted to verify or supplement 
the allegations made by the client-complainant. Such evidence, if un-
rebutted by the attorney who claims the right to silence, would often 
carry the state's burden, which is generally described as that of pre-
senting clear and convincing proof, rather than proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.179 
But there would still be many instances in which even an ade-
quately trained, staffed, and :financed disciplinary agency cannot 
prove misconduct without the records of the attorney. As suggested 
by Justice Fortas in his concurrence in Spevack, in these situations 
a legal framework for compelling the attorney to produce the neces-
sary records could be provided by the "required records" doctrine. 
This doctrine was developed in Shapiro v. United States,180 where 
the Supreme Court held that the privilege against self-incrimination 
does not extend to " 'records required by law to be kept in order 
that there may be suitable information of transactions which are the 
appropriate subjects of governmental regulation and the enforce-
ment or restrictions validly established.' "181 The doctrine was ap-
plied in Shapiro to a wholesale produce dealer's sales records kept 
in accordance with the Emergency Price Control Act.182 
Recent opinions have identified three interrelated elements of 
the required records doctrine: "[F]irst, the purposes of the ... in-
quiry must be essentially regulatory; second, information is to be 
obtained by requiring the preservation of records of a kind which 
the regulated party has customarily kept; and third, the records them-
selves must have assumed 'public aspects' which render them at least 
analogous to public documents.''183 The Court has further limited 
the necessary "public aspects" to situations in which there is more 
than a governmental need to obtain information.184 The state must 
also have the authority to regulate or prohibit the basic activity and, 
thus, to require the keeping of specific records for inspection by an 
179. In re Wilson, 106 Ariz. 34, 470 P.2d 441 (1970) (clear and convincing proof); 
In re Simpson, 47 Ill. 2d 562, 268 N.E.2d 20 (1971) (clear and convincing proof); Iowa 
State Bar Assn. v. Kraschel, 260 Iowa 187, 194, 148 N.W.2d 621, 625 (1967) (convincing 
preponderance of the evidence). Contra, Cushway v. State Bar, 120 Ga. App. 371, 170 
S.E.2d 732 (1969) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt). 
180. 335 U.S. 1 (1948). 
181. 335 U.S. at 33, quoting Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 589-90 (1946). 
182. Ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23. 
183. Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1968). Although the cases cited in 
Grosso deal specifically with required records only in the federal context, the incorpo-
ration of the fifth amendment privilege into the fourteenth amendment's requirement 
of due process, in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), makes the required records 
doctrine equally applicable in state proceedings. See text accompanying notes 8-9 supra. 
184. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 57 (1968). 
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appropriate government official.185 This rule could easily be applied 
in the regulation of the bar. The bar has long been subject to the 
states' power to regulate,186 and the type of detailed information that 
might be required to be disclosed, such as that relating to the han-
dling of client's funds, should generally involve little more than the 
record-keeping expected of a conscientious fiduciary.187 
The records to be required should be carefully defined in order 
to avoid any conflict with the attorney-client privilege.188 However, 
any inroad that the adoption of this doctrine may make upon the 
attorney-client privilege would be small in comparison to the inroad 
presently made by the broader requirement that the attorney dis-
close all requested information relevant to his fitness. 
A limited use of the required records doctrine could minimize the 
encroachment on the attorney's right against self-incrimination while 
protecting the interests of his clients and society. In some cases, it is 
true, neither independent investigation nor the use of the required 
records doctrine may develop evidence sufficient to carry the state's 
burden of proof. It is suggested that this situation is precisely that in 
which the primary purpose of the privilege-forcing the state to 
shoulder the entire load and respect the privacy of the individual-
dictates that the individual's interest be protected by the fifth amend-
ment. 
If the required records doctrine is held applicable, so that the 
state's interest is sufficiently protected, the courts may find that the 
individual's interest in nondisclosure is such that the policies and 
history of the privilege compel classification of disbarment as quasi-
criminal. 
II. DOES IMMUNITY PROHIBIT DISBARMENT BASED ON THE 
COMPELLED DISCLOSURES? 
A second question regarding the attorney's privilege against self-
incrimination is whether the immunity that may be offered in ex-
change for a waiver of the privilege prohibits disbarment, as well as 
criminal sanctions, based on the compelled disclosures. The Supreme 
Court long ago established that statutes that grant immunity are not 
incompatible with the privilege against self-incrimination, 180 for they 
185. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 34-35 (1948). 
186. See notes 3.5 supra and accompanying text. 
187. Manahan, Lawyers Should Be Audited, 59 A.B.A.J. 396, 398 (1973); Niles r.: 
Kaye, supra note I, at 1125-26. 
188. The attorney-client privilege prohibits the compelled disclosure by eitl1er 
attorney or client of communications made in confidence by the client when legal 
advice was sought from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, unless the 
client waives the privilege. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CODE OF PRO• 
fESSIONAL R.EsPONSIBILITY, Canon 4 (1970); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 30, §§ 2290-329, 
J89. Brgwn v. Walk~, 161 V.S, 591 (1896), 
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"seek a rational accommodation bettveen the imperatives of the privi-
lege and the legitimate demand of the government to compel citizens 
to testify."190 Thus, the government may constitutionally compel an 
individual to divulge self-incriminatory information by granting him 
immunity from criminal sanctions based on the disclosure. However, 
this immunity is adequate only if it is as broad as the protection of 
the privilege that it replaces.191 
The breadth of any particular immunity depends upon the in-
tent of the legislation under which it is conferred. In practical terms, 
it seems fair to assume that in most cases the legislature intends its 
immunity statutes to be only as broad as is required by the Constitu-
tion.192 Thus, the question becomes whether the Constitution re-
quires that the immunity granted protect the attorney from disbar-
ment on the basis of compelled disclosures. 
In Ullmann v. United States,193 a majority of the Supreme Court 
held that the government may constitutionally impose, or permit 
the imposition of serious, though noncriminal, sanctions based on 
disclosures made under a grant of immunity. In Ullmann the peti-
tioner was given immunity in order to testify before a federal grand 
jury about his knowledge of and participation in espionage and about 
his and others' membership in the Communist Party. He claimed 
that the immunity statute involved was not broad enough because of 
disabilities, "such as loss of job, expulsion from labor unions, state 
registration and investigation statutes, passport eligibility, and gen-
eral public opprobrium,''194 that might still be imposed by the state 
and federal authorities, as well as by the general public. The Court 
reiterated its frequent holding that immunity, to be constitutionally 
valid, need only remove the sanctions that generate the fear that 
justifies the invocation of the privilege-that is, criminal sanctions.195 
190. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 446 (1972). 
191. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). 
192. Cf. In re Colacasides, 6 Mich. App. 298, 148 N.W.2d 898, afjd., 379 Mich. 69, 
150 N.W.2d 1 (1967). 
193. 350 U.S. 422 (1956). 
194. 350 U.S. at 430. 
195. 350 U.S. at 430-31. The dissent in Ullmann, 350 U.S. at 440-55 (Douglas & Black, 
JJ., dissenting), suggests an alternative analysis, which would require that immunity, 
to be constitutionally adequate to compel self-incriminatory disclosures, must leave the 
individual in the same relative position vis-a-vis the state as before disclosure. This 
requirement would not, of course, place any burden on the state to prohibit sanctions 
(for example, loss of employment) imposed by private third parties. It would, however, 
prevent the state from imposing sanctions normally used in addition to criminal sanc-
tions-e.g., loss of the vote, passport eligibility, and/or eligibility for various licensed 
professions-to punish, in effect, the individuals for the activities disclosed. 
This argument suggests that the attorney should not be placed between the rock 
and the whirlpool by the operation of an immunity statute. That is, if he testifies and 
incriminates himself, he stands to lose his practice, which is probably his most valuable 
J>OSSession, as well as his honor. If he chooses to cling to silence, he stands to be held 
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Thus, in order to establish that a grant of immunity, to be constitu-
tionally valid, must prevent the imposition of a given sanction, the 
individual must prove that the particular sanction is criminal. Un-
der the Ullmann rationale, which has been reaffirmed by the present 
Court,196 disbarment on the basis of testimony given under immunity 
would be impermissible only if the disbarment itself is viewed as a 
criminal sanction. 
The New York courts have followed this reasoning and have 
repeatedly found that disbarment based on testimony compelled 
under a grant of immunity is permissible.197 In reaching this con-
clusion, they have relied primarily on the fact that the Supreme 
Court had not found disbarment proceedings to be criminal. The 
New York courts then found that the privilege, which is literally 
limited to criminal proceedings, does not apply to disbarment and 
that, therefore, no immunity from disbarment need be granted. 
in contempt, possibly imprisoned. Such a willful contempt citation may serve as a 
ground for disbarment. See, e.g., In re Daly, 291 Minn. 488, 189 N.W.2d 1'76 (1971); 
In re Isserman, 9 N.J. 269, 87 A.2d 903 (1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 927 (1953}, If, under 
these pressures, he lies, he will have committed perjury and again may not only be 
imprisoned but also be disbarred. E.g., People v. Gibbons, 157 Colo. 357, 403 P.2d 434 
(1965); Silver v. Goldner, 15 App. Div. 2d 558, 222 N.Y.S.2d 854, affd., 14 N.\'.2d 593, 
198 N.E.2d 262, 248 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 959 (1965). Thus, it can 
be argued that an immunity statute that protects the individual only from criminal 
sanctions subjects him to the cruel trilemma that the privilege against self-incrimination 
attempts to prohibit. 
However, the present Court appears unlikely to accept this argument, In addition 
to citing Ullmann with approval, it rejected an analogous argument by Justice Marshall 
in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 467-71 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting), that 
an individual could not be put in a worse practical position vis-a-vis the government 
by the use of an immunity statute. In Kastigar Justice Marshall argued that it may be 
impossible to prove that evidence used to convict resulted from the use or derivative 
use of the compelled testimony, rather than from an independent source, Even if the 
state bears the burden of proving that the source was untainted, it may meet this 
burden with mere assertions unless the individual asserts some contrary proof. Thus, 
the protection of the individual from the use of his compelled testimony is placed in 
the hands of individuals whose main duty is to convict such persons. 406 U.S. at 468-69 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). 
196. Zicarelli v. New Jersey Investigating Commn., 406 U.S. 472 (1972); Kastigar v. 
United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). The Court held that transactional immunity, which 
completely prohibits prosecution for any offenses disclosed by testimony under immu-
nity, though permissible, was not constitutionally required. The purpose of the 
privilege against self-incrimination.-to avoid compelling disclosures that could furnish 
a link in the chain leading to prosecution-is satisfied if the disclosure itself and any 
evidence obtained by the use of the disclosure is excluded from subsequent criminal 
proceedings. In order to compel disclosure the immunity need be only as broad as the 
privilege. 
197. In re Klebanoff, 21 N.Y.2d 920, 237 N.E.2d 75, 289 N.Y.S.2d '755, cert. denied, 
393 U.S. 840 (1968); In re Epstein, 37 App. Div. 2d 333, 325 N.Y.S.2d 65'7, appeal dis• 
missed, 29 N.Y.2d 875, 328 N.Y.S.2d 1031 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972); 
In re Selig, 32 App. Div. 2d 213, 302 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1969); In re Ungar, 27 App. Div. 2d 
925, 282 N.Y.S.2d 155, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1007 (1967). Similar statutes in other states 
have also been held constitutional. E.g., Napolitano v. Ward, 317 F. Supp. 83 (N.D, Ill. 
1970), afjd., 457 F.2d 279 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1037 (1972) (removal of judge); 
In re Schwarz, 51 Ill. 2d 344, 282 N.E.2d 689 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 104'7 {1973), 
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However, if the analysis suggested in section 1198 is adopted, and 
disbarment is treated as quasi-criminal for purposes of the privilege, 
the immunity exchanged for the privilege should also prohibit dis-
barment based on the compelled disclosures.199 This approach, how-
ever, raises the possibility that an attorney whose admitted conduct 
has demonstrated that he is unfit will be permitted to continue to 
practice. This prospect appears so objectionable that it alone might 
justify a refusal to change the accepted classification of disbarment 
as a civil sanction for purposes of both questions, so that neither the 
privilege against self-incrimination nor immunity would bar the 
compulsion of disclosures or the use of disclosed information in 
disciplinary proceedings.200 Even in the criminal context, however, 
every instance in which immunity is extended results not only in 
social benefit from the use of the testimony compelled, but also in the 
social cost of foregoing the punishment of the individual.201 There 
is always some potential harm if the individual is allowed to go un-
punished, for he may continue to engage in the conduct revealed un-
der immunity. The problem presented by an attorney's testifying 
under immunity is no different qualitatively than that presented by 
the operation of immunity statutes in general, although it may differ 
quantitatively: The potential for harm to third persons is multiplied 
because the attorney is allowed to continue-with the apparent ap-
proval of the state-in the fiduciary position that he has misused in 
the past. 
This, however, does not necessarily justify rejecting the over-all 
classification of disbarment as a penal sanction. Rather, it is but one 
factor in determining whether to grant immunity to a given attorney. 
Under the present system the social cost involved in foregoing punish-
ment is weighed against the benefits to be gained by compelling testi-
mony in each case; if the social cost is too high, the immunity is with-
198. See text accompanying notes 31-188 supra. 
199. This analysis is consistent with Ullmann, which expressly provided that the 
petitioner could avoid the sanctions that he alleged might be imposed by successfully 
showing them to be criminal. 350 U.S. at 431. 
200. In a similar situation, Judge Cardozo concluded: "[W]e will not declare, unless 
driven to it by sheer necessity, that a confessed criminal has been intrenched by the 
very confession of his guilt beyond the power of removal." In re Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 
85, 116 N.E. 782, 783 (1917), cert. denied, 246 U.S. 661 (1918). The courts have achieved 
the most fle.xibility in the area of bar discipline by carefully defining the purpose of 
their proceedings as nonpunitive and thus civil or sui generis. Thus, in addition to the 
fact that testimony given under immunity could be used to disbar, it has been held 
that neith.er pardon nor acquittal of a criminal offense would bar discipline and that 
no statute of limitations applies to a disciplinary proceeding. See In re Nilva, 266 Minn. 
576, 583, 123 N.W.2d 803, 808-09 (1963); In re Pennica, 36 N.J. 401, 428-29; 433-34, 177 
A.2d 721, 735, 738 (1962); In re Schildhaus, 23 App. Div. 2d 152, 259 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1965); 
H. DRINKER, supra note 94, at 35.-38. 
201. Immunity statutes were intended to serve as a method of balancing various 
social costs and benefits. Compare Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 446 (1972) 
with 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 30, § 2281, at 492. 
ll2 Michigan Law Review [Vol. '12:84 
held. The fact that it is undesirable to allow an attorney who has 
admitted conduct that demonstrates his lack of fitness to continue 
practicing law only indicates that the social cost of granting immunity 
will often be too high.202 It does not alter the conclusion that, if 
immunity is granted, disbarment should be classified as a penal or 
quasi-criminal sanction so that the disclosures made under immunity 
cannot be used to disbar. 
III. MAY THE ATTORNEY'S CLAIM OF THE PRIVILEGE BE 
USED AS EVIDENCE OF HIS LACK OF FITNESS? 
The final question deals, not with the extent of an attorney's 
privilege against self-incrimination, but with the effect of its use in 
a disciplinary proceeding. Spevack held that an attorney could not 
be disbarred solely on the basis of his exercise of the privilege.203 
May the state nevertheless, through comment or inference, point to 
his silence as one indication of his guilt? Or may the state disbar the 
attorney on the ground that his refusal to answer demonstrates that 
he lacks the candor and cooperativeness required of attorneys? 
A. Comment on and Inference from the Use of the Privilege 
In a criminal proceeding, a comment by the prosecutor or the 
court to the effect that the defendant's exercise of his privilege against 
self-incrimination indicates his guilt itself violates the defendant's 
privilege. In Griffin v. California,204 the Supreme Court held that 
such a comment by a prosecutor was improper because it made the 
assertion of the privilege "costly." The trial court may not "solemnize 
the silence of the accused into evidence against him."200 The Court 
distinguished this impermissible conversion of the privilege into 
evidence of guilt from the permissible and natural presumption of 
guilt that may flow from evidence uncontroverted by the defendant. 
The state courts have divided on whether the Griffin principle 
should be applied to disbarment proceedings. The question was an-
swered in the negative in State v. Postorino,206 where the Wisconsin 
supreme court interpreted Spevack as indicating only that "the taking 
of the fifth amendment is not in itself a ground for disbarment."207 
The court relied on a state statute and state judicial precedent that 
202. It may, for example, be more dangerous to allow a self-confessed murderer to 
remain at large unpunished than it would be to allow an unfit person to continue 
practicing law. The traditional solution to the problem presented by the murderer 
would be to decide not to extend immunity, rather than to reclassify imprisonment 
as a nonpenal sanction. 
203. See text accompanying notes 10-24 supra. 
204. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
205. 380 U.S. at 614. 
206. 53 Wis. 2d 412, 193 N.W.2d 1 (1972). 
207. 53 Wis. 2d at 416-17, 193 N.W.2d at 3 (emphasis added), 
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characterized disciplinary proceedings as civil and concluded that in 
such a proceeding the fifth amendment does not foreclose the court 
from drawing an inference of guilt or an inference against the inter-
est of the attorney who claims the privilege.208 In that case, there was 
sufficient evidence without the inference to support the finding that 
the attorney was not fit. 
In contrast, the Michigan supreme court, in State Bar v. Woll,209 
held that the fifth amendment prohibited a prosecutor's comment, 
in a disbarment proceeding, that an attorney's exercise of the privi-
lege in the course of the proceeding indicated that he had engaged 
in misconduct. The court stated that Michigan had long considered 
disbarment proceedings to be quasi-criminal in character and noted: 
"While not strictly a criminal prosecution, it is of that nature, and 
the punishment, in prohibiting the party following his ordinary 
occupation, would be severe and highly penal."210 
These conclusions are contrary primarily because of the difference 
in the respective state precedent regarding the characterization of 
disciplinary proceedings. Both opinions are based on the premise 
that in a civil case an opposing party's comment or a trier of fact's 
negative inference based on a failure to testify would not violate the 
privilege against self-incrimination. There is substantial authority 
in support of this position211 from courts that have interpreted the 
Griffen and Spevack cases as not going "so far as to absolutely pro-
scribe the visitation of any and all consequences upon one who in-
vokes the Fifth Amendment."212 One court reasoned that "[t]he ad-
ministration of justice and the search for truth demands that an 
inference may be drawn .... "213 However, it is also possible to read 
the Spevack and Griffen language, which forbids penalties that make 
the exercise of the privilege "costly," more broadly so as to preclude 
adverse comment or inference in all civil cases. At least one court 
has accepted this reading and prohibited comments on the exercise 
of the privilege in civil cases generally.214 
208. 53 Wis. at 417, 193 N.W.2d at 3. 
209. 387 Mich. 154, 194 N.W.2d 835 (1972). 
210. 387 Mich. at 161, 194 N.W.2d at 838, quoting In re Baluss, 28 Mich. 507, 508 
(1874). 
211. E.g., Kaye v. Newhall, 356 Mass. 300, 304-06, 249 N.E.2d 583, 585-86 (1969) 
(dicta: both comment and inference permissible); Duratron Corp. v. Republic Stuyvesant 
Corp., 95 N.J. Super. 527, 231 A.2d 854, cert. denied, 50 N.J. 404, 235 A.2d 897 (1967) 
(inference); Molloy v. Molloy, 46 Wis. 2d 682, 176 N.W.2d 292 (1970) (inference). A 
number of other harsh consequences may follow from the assertion of the privilege 
in a civil action. See text accompanying notes 215-17 infra; authorities cited in note 
223 infra. 
212. Duratron Corp. v. Republic Stuyvesant Corp., 95 N.J. Super. 527, 533, 231 A.2d 
854, 857, cert. denied, 50 N.J. 404, 235 A.2d 87 (1967). 
213. Molloy v. Molloy, 46 Wis. 2d 682, 688, 176 N.W.2d 292, 296 (1970). 
214. Kaneshiro v. Belisario, 51 Hawaii 649, 651-53, 466 P.2d 452, 454-55 (1970). Cf. 
De Antonio v. Solomon, 42 F.R.D. 320 (1967) (suit for alienation of affections; defendant 
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Even if disbarment is characterized as civil for this purpose and 
the state in question generally permits adverse comments or infer-
ences in a civil proceeding, disbarment proceedings may be distin-
guished from other civil actions. Although the courts may not be 
convinced that the severity of the consequences of disbarment is suffi-
cient to characterize disbarment as a criminal proceeding, this severity 
does suggest that disbarment is more costly than other civil sanctions, 
such as dismissal of a cause of action215 or the striking of pleadings216 
or testimony,217 where the greatest potential loss or penalty for assert-
ing the privilege is generally a money judgment. 
In addition, in disbarment proceedings it is the state, rather than 
a private party to a civil suit, that seeks to turn the privilege into 
evidence of misconduct. This is the sort of direct state action against 
which the :fifth amendment privilege clearly protects.218 In civil 
cases, the state action is more indirect, for it consists only of allowing 
the private party to make negative comments about the assertion of 
the privilege while enforcing his rights through the state judicial 
machinery.219 
In addition, when the privilege to remain silent is asserted in a 
civil proceeding the adverse private party is prejudiced. Arguably, he 
ought to be allowed to compensate for the evidence made unavail-
able by his opponent by commenting upon or drawing an inference 
from the other's silence.220 It is less unjust to refuse to allow the state, 
refused to answer complaint responsively, claiming privilege; default judgment held 
unconstitutional penalty for assertion of privilege). 
215. E.g., Minor v. Minor, 240 S.2d 301 (Fla. 1970); Stockham v. Stockham, 168 S.2d 
320 (Fla. 1964). 
216. E.g., Rubenstein v. Kleven, 150 F. Supp. 4'1 (D. Mass. 195'1). 
217. E.g., Berner v. Schlesinger, 11 Misc. 2d 1024, 178 N.Y.S.2d 135 (Sup. Ct. 1957), 
a/jd., 6 App. Div. 2d 781, 175 N.Y.S.2d 579 (1958). 
218. Governments, state and federal, are thus constitutionally compelled to cstab• 
lish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured, and may not by coercion 
prove a charge against an accused out of his own mouth. • • • The Fourteenth 
Amendment secures against state invasion the same privilege that the Fifth Amend• 
ment guarantees against federal infringement-the right of a person to remain 
silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will ••.• 
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I, 8 (1964). 
219. Enforcement of private rights through state judicial machinery may constitute 
state action for the purposes of the fourteenth amendment. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 
U.S. 1 (1948). 
220. Kaminsky, Preventing Unfair Use of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination 
in Private Civil Litigation: A Critical Analysis, 39 BROOKLYN L. REV. 121, 127-28 (1972) 
(emphasis original): 
It is often said that the rationale underlying the privilege is not protection of the 
innocent, but rather preservation of the integrity of our legal system in which 
the prosecution must bear the full burden of proof and in which all citizens are 
guaranteed a "zone of privacy" from the government. Whatever relevance these 
metaphysical concepts may have with respect to governmental inquiries, they arc 
meaningless in the context of private litigation and damage claims being waged 
by two private citizens. The privilege was conceived as a protection for the 
accused against an inquisitorial-like system of accusers; it should be remembered 
and applied as such. In civil cases involving only private parties, the government is 
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which is intended to be limited by the privilege, to use such a com-
pensating device in disbarment proceedings. 
Furthermore, even though the majority of courts that have con-
sidered the problem have ruled that a plaintiff who claims the privi-
lege in a civil action may be subject to severe disabilities, including 
the dismissal of his actioi:J.,221 at least two courts have refused to allow 
any inference to be drawn from the defendant's claim of the privi-
lege.222 Allowing a party who actively seeks the aid of the court to 
insist on the nondisclosure of essential aspects of the case seems more 
unfair than allowing a party to assert the privilege while resisting 
liability.223 The attorney in a disciplinary proceeding is in the latter 
position. 
Thus, even if disbarment is characterized as civil, it may be dis-
tinguished from other civil proceedings for purposes of prohibiting 
inferences of guilt from the attorney's assertion of the privilege. 
B. Disbarment for Lack of Frankness 
Even if the state's counsel in a disbarment proceeding may not 
urge directly that the exercise of the privilege indicates guilt of the 
conduct charged, may the state nevertheless conclude that the accused 
attorney's silence in itself indicates a lack of the frankness and candor 
required of an officer of the court? And may such a finding of lack of 
frankness and candor constitute grounds, alone or in conjunction 
with other evidence, for disbarment? 
There is a practical incompatibility between the duty to speak 
candidly and the privilege to remain silent without penalty. Since 
the mid-1950's there have been a number of split decisions on this 
question that have involved public employees; some decisions place 
priority on the individual's interests that are protected by the privi-
lege, while others give priority to the state's interest in having frank 
and candid employees. 
The first such decision was Slochower v. Board of Education,224 
in no way involved, and "privacy" is not the issue at hand: the more pertinent ques-
tion, rather, is how to assure that the privilege is not applied so as to give one 
citizen an unfair advantage over his fellow citizen. 
221. See, e.g., Stockham v. Stockham, 168 S.2d 320 (Fla. 1964); Levine v. Bornstein, 
13 Misc. 2d 161, 174 N.Y.S.2d 574 (Sup. Ct. 1958), afjd. mem., 7 App. Div. 2d 995, 183 
N.Y.S.2d 868, affd., 6 N.Y.2d 892, 160 N.E.2d 921, 190 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1959). 
222, State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. McHenery, 69 S.2d 52 (La. Ct. App. 1953); 
Berg v. Penttila, 173 Minn. 512, 217 N.W. 935 (1928). See generally Note, supra note 
33, at 331-35. 
223, Kaminsky, supra note 220, at 143-49; Comment, supra note 33, at 77-79; Note, 
supra note 33, at 331-35. But see Molloy v. Molloy, 46 Wis. 2d 682, 176 N.W.2d 292 
(1970). 
224. 350 U.S. 551 (1956). Justices Black and Douglas joined the Court's judgment 
and opinion but also adhered to their dissents in Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 
485 (1952), and Gamer v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951), and to their 
concurrences in Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). 350 U.S. at 559. 
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which held that due process requirements were violated by the dis-
missal of a New York city college professor who refused to answer 
questions put to him by a federal congressional committee about his 
membership in the Communist Party. The New York court of ap-
peals found that no inference of guilt had been drawn;220 it held that 
the discharge was permissible because it had been done in accordance 
with the city charter, which validly imposed as a condition of em-
ployment the requirement that city employees not invoke the privi-
lege before a legislative committee.226 
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the employee's silence 
had, in effect, been treated as a confession of guilt and made the basis 
of his discharge.227 The board of education had contended in its brief 
that only two inferences could be drawn from the professor's assertion 
of the privilege against self-incrimination: first, that his answers 
would tend to prove his guilt; or, second, that he had falsely asserted 
the privilege in order to avoid answering and had thus committed 
perjury.228 The Court found that the board had "seized upon his 
claim of privilege ... and converted it through the use of § 903 [ of 
the New York City Charter] into a conclusive presumption of guilt. 
Since no inference of guilt was possible from the claim before the 
federal committee, the discharge [must fall] of its own weight as 
wholly without support."229 The Supreme Court thus rejected the 
New York court's conclusion and independently determined that the 
effect of the charter provision was to treat silence as an admission of 
guilt-a "sinister" inference. 
In the late 1950's and early 1960's, however, the Court retreated 
from the full implications of Slochower and emphasized instead Slo-
chower's reference to a "sinister inference" of guilt. Retreating from 
its willingness to determine the effect of a state statute independently, 
the Court upheld several statutes that provided for disclosure or dis-
missal on the ground that in each case the state had interpreted the 
statutes as basing dismissal solely on a violation of the duty of frank-
ness and candor, rather than on any evidence of guilt or wrongdoing. 
In Beilan v. Board of Education,239 Lerner v. Casey,231 and Nelson v. 
County of Los Angeles,232 the Court approved the dismissals of, re-
225. Daniman v. :Board of Educ., 306 N.Y. 532, 538, 119 N.E.2d 373, 3'1'7 (1954). 
226. Daniman v. :Board of Educ., 306 N.Y. 532, 538-39, 119 N.E.2d 373, 3'1'7-78 (1954). 
227. 350 U.S. at 558. 
228. 350 U.S. at 556-57. 
229. 350 U.S. at 559. 
230. 357 U.S. 399 (1958). 
231. 35'1 U.S. 468 (1958). The Court also held the federal privilege against self• 
incrimination inapplicable to a refusal to answer in a state proceeding. 357 U.S. at 478. 
This view was overruled in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
232. 362 U.S. 1 (1960), 
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spectively, a school teacher, a subway conductor, and a social worker 
on the basis of this reasoning. 
The Spevack opinion, which did rely on Slochower,233 neither dis-
tinguished nor mentioned Lerner, Beilan, or Nelson. However, 
Spevack overruled Cohen and reversed a New York court of appeals 
decision, both of which relied in part on the violation of the duty of 
frankness and candor.234 In Spevack the focus was not on the type of 
inference permitted-either of guilt or of lack of the required candor 
and frankness-but on the effect on the privilege. Imposition of dis-
barment as the price for asserting the privilege was impermissible 
because it had the effect of watering down the protection of the 
privilege. 
Thus, under present case law the Spevack decision, though not 
fully applicable to all public employees,235 is the controlling prece-
dent for attorneys. In spirit, if not by holding, it appears to preclude 
the use of an attorney's exercise of his privilege to disbar him, even 
if the state justifies its action, not on exercise of the privilege per se 
nor on a sinister inference of ·wrongdoing, but simply on a failure to 
fulfill a duty of candor. However, the membership of the court has 
changed significantly since the Spevack opinion; most significantly, 
Justice Fortas, the major proponent of the distinction between attor-
neys and other public employees, has left. 
Whether comment or inference of unfitness should be permitted 
when it is based on lack of candor, rather than on actual guilt of the 
offense charged, depends on the outcome of the balancing test that 
the Court characteristically uses to determine the scope of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination.236 It would seem that, if the public 
interest cannot justify compelling disclosure in the first instance, it 
cannot justify reaching the same effect by converting privileged re-
fusal to speak into evidence of a new misconduct. Thus, if the Spe-
vack rule itself is to be maintained, it should not be undermined by 
allowing adverse comment or presumptive inference to be based on 
the assertion of the privilege. 
233. 385 U.S. at 516. 
234. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 121-27 (1961); In Te Spevack, 16 N.Y.2d 1048, 
1050, 213 N.E.2d 457, 458, 266 N.Y.S.2d 126, 126 (1965). 
235. See text accompanying notes 27-28 supra. 
236. See text accompanying notes 43-61 supm. 
